SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES ON THE INTERNET THROUGH
SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION

Elizabeth A. Rowe

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................3
A. THE POWER OF THE INTERNET ...............................................................................5
B. LEGAL COMPLICATIONS .........................................................................................7
C. THE ARTICLE’S MISSION........................................................................................8
II. TRADE SECRET LAW BACKGROUND .........................................................10
A. LAWFUL USE OF ANOTHER’S TRADE SECRETS ....................................................12
B. EQUITABLE NATURE OF TRADE SECRET LAW ......................................................13
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW ......................................................15
A. THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CASES ................................................................15
B. DVD COPY CONTROL ASSOC. V. BUNNER ...........................................................17
C. UNITED STATES V. GENOVESE .............................................................................20
IV. ANALYZING THE THIRD PARTY PROBLEM ...........................................21
A. IS IT A TRADE SECRET?.........................................................................................23
1.
Is a Posting on the Internet “Generally Known”?..................................26
2.
Is a Posting on the Internet “Readily Ascertainable”?...........................29
B. IS IT MISAPPROPRIATION?....................................................................................33
V. OTHER OBSTACLES TO TRADE SECRET PROTECTION.......................36
A. FIRST AMENDMENT .............................................................................................37
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT .........................................................................................39
C. PATENT LAW .......................................................................................................40
VI. ASSISTANCE FROM ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE CASES.............43
A. IN RE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING BERKLEY AND CO .......................43
B. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. CLAYTON J. DEAN ................................................44
C. C.P. SMITH V. ARMOUR PHARMACEUTICALS .......................................................45
D. UNITED STATES EX REL. JERRY MAYMAN V. MARTIN MARIETTA .......................46
VII. THE SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION MODEL ........................................47
A. THRESHOLD ISSUE – ESTABLISH TRADE SECRET STATUS ....................................48
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. J.D. Harvard Law School, Cum
Laude. I am very grateful to Pamela Samuelson of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, as well as my
colleagues Andrea Matwyshn, William Page, and Sharon Rush for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
I also appreciate the comments provided by participants of the 2006 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference
held at the University of California Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law, where this paper was presented. Finally, I
would like to thank Luke Napodano and Dana Sellers for their valuable research assistance.

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

2

B. THE THREE FACTORS ...........................................................................................50
1.
Time and Action ......................................................................................51
2.
Extent of Disclosure ................................................................................53
3.
Recipient’s Reason to Know the Information was Trade Secret .............55
VIII. SUMMARY AND APPLICATION OF THE SEQUENTIAL
PRESERVATION MODEL .............................................................................................60
A. THEORETICAL CHECKLIST OF THE MODEL ..........................................................60
B. APPLICATION WITH CASE EXAMPLES ...................................................................62
1.
Religious Technology Center v. Lerma ...................................................62
2.
DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner......................................................64
3.
O’Grady v. Superior Court .....................................................................65
4.
United States v. Genovese.......................................................................69
IX. REMEDIES ..........................................................................................................71
X. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................74

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

3

I. INTRODUCTION
Soft Corporation is a leading maker of software and operating
systems. It undertakes great measures to protect the secrecy of its new
products under development, plans to launch new products, technical
product specifications, and product source codes, all of which it considers
company trade secrets. A disgruntled employee, John Sneaky, one of the
few persons with access to the source code to Soft’s soon to be released
operating system, Win100, posts the source code (labeled “Confidential –
Soft Proprietary Information”) on a members-only website critical of Soft,
Softsucks.com.
Soft discovers the posting within six hours of its appearing on the
site, and after informing the site operator that the information is a stolen
Soft trade secret, it is immediately removed. Prior to its removal, however,
Sam Quickbuck, had downloaded the source code. When he realized, the
next day that the source code was no longer available on Softsucks.com he
decided to capitalize on the opportunity.
He posted a notice on his web site offering the code for sale:
“Win100 source code, original, (jacked from inside) available for sale. Get
it here before it’s even released and stick it to Soft. If you wanna buy it
($50) I’ll give you a password to download it.”
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Soft sues Quickbuck for misappropriation of trade secrets, seeking a
preliminary injunction to prohibit his use and sale of the source code. After
a hearing, the court denies relief to Soft, reasoning that despite Soft’s best
efforts to keep the source code secret, it has lost its trade secret status by
virtue of it appearing on the Internet, and that Quickbuck cannot be
enjoined from using it. Soft now faces widespread use of its source code by
other competitors and a resulting loss of market share for its Win100
operating system. As a result of the ruling, it can no longer claim the source
code as a trade secret.
This hypothetical1 introduces the problem and accompanying
questions tackled by this Article. When, for instance, an employee
discloses an employer’s trade secrets to the public over the Internet, does
our current trade secret framework appropriately address the consequences
of that disclosure? What ought to be the rule which governs whether the
trade secret owner has lost not only the protection status for the secret, but
any remedies against use by third parties? Should the ease with which the
Internet permits instant and mass disclosure of secrets be taken into
consideration in assessing the fairness of a rule which calls for immediate
loss of the trade secret upon disclosure?

1
This hypothetical is loosely based on United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D. N.Y. 2005)
(discussed infra at sections III(C) and VIII(B)(4).
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A. The Power of the Internet
Although trade secret owners have always risked disclosure of their
highly sensitive and confidential information, today the Internet magnifies
that risk exponentially.2 It facilitates complete destruction of a trade secret
in an instant, and the law strips the trade secret owner’s power to control or
contain the damage. Even when the party posting3 the information may not
have intended to cause harm to the trade secret owner, the injury can be no
less devastating.4 One court, while refusing to enjoin publication of a
company’s trade secrets on First Amendment grounds, nevertheless noted
the shift in balance of power made possible by the Internet: “[w]ith the
Internet, significant leverage is gained by the gadfy, who has no editor
looking over his shoulder and no professional ethics to constrain him.
Technology blurs the traditional identities of David and Goliath.”5

2
The Internet has become an important part of daily life, connecting approximately 800 million people to a
global network. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right, 56
Hastings L.J. 1, 4 (2004). Over fifty percent of all households are connected to the Internet. See Daniel W. Park,
Trade Secrets, The First Amendment, and Patent Law: A Collision on the Information Superhighway, 10 Stan. J.
L. Bus. & Fin. 46, 47 (2004). Its presence has changed the way in which the world does business and its impact
on the economy is far reaching. See generally Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Symposium: Personal Jurisdiction In The
Internet Age: Of Nodes And Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach To Internet Jurisdiction Through Data
Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 493, 499 (2004) (discussing trends in the Internet economy).

3
This Article often refers to trade secret information being posted on the Internet. Posting “consists of
directly placing material on or in a Web site, bulletin board, discussion group, newsgroup, or similar Internet site
or ‘forum,’ where it will appear automatically and more or less immediately to be seen by anyone with access to
that forum.” O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *13 (Cal. App. May 26,
2006). It therefore allows direct self-publication of information, or one may also send information to a site, the
owners or moderators of which make decisions about what to post. See id. at *13-14
4
See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(holding that FDA
could be liable for misappropriation of trade secrets where it posted plaintiff’s trade secrets on its website for five
months).
5

Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753-54 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
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Unlike other mass media which generally have staff who decide
what materials will be published, the Internet has no such filter. Any person
sitting at a computer may post information onto the Internet, resulting in
immediate and irreparable harm. One judge captured the problem in these
words:
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user . . .
can destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting
them over the Internet, especially given the fact that there is
little opportunity to screen postings before they are made . . .
Nonetheless, one of the Internet’s virtues, that it gives even
the poorest individuals the power to publish to millions of
readers . . . can also be a detriment to the value of intellectual
property rights. The anonymous (or judgment proof)
defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets,
leaving no one to hold liable for misappropriation.6
The power of the Internet has added complexity to the archetypal two
person misappropriation framework traditionally encountered in trade secret
law. Misappropriation claims often arise in an employment context, for
instance, where an employee leaves for new employment with a competitor
and takes the former employer’s trade secrets. The employer, trade secret
owner, can state misappropriation claims against the former employee, and
often the new employer.7 In the case of an Internet disclosure, however, the
current law suggests that there is no claim against the third parties who
6

Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Servs., Inc.., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
7

See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine , 7 Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 176-77 (2005).
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discover the information, and thus no feasible way to contain the
dissemination of the trade secret.
B. Legal Complications
Further complicating the situation is that trade secret law only
protects secret information. Consistent with that framework, it is therefore
difficult to argue that information which appears on the World Wide Web,
and which is admittedly no longer secret, can retain trade secret protection.
Yet, trade secret law is also equitable, and intended to regulate the morality
of the business world. Why then should we create incentives for
inappropriate and unethical conduct, by permitting a single individual’s
disclosure of a trade secret to destroy that which has been so well guarded
by a trade secret owner? A sound analysis of this complicated problem
calls for a balancing of the right of the trade secret owner to preserve its
trade secret information, the right of an innocent independent third party to
use information found in the public domain, and the policies favoring fair
competition.
A view from outside trade secret law also provides guidance for and
against the case for retention of trade secret status after an Internet
disclosure. On one hand, constitutional law and patent law considerations
lean toward prohibiting restrictions on the use of publicly available
information. On the other hand, attorney client privilege cases, in
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analogous circumstances support preservation. Some of these areas of law
provide further insight into analogous incentives for wrongdoing.
C. The Article’s Mission
Several commentators have identified the general problem posed by
trade secret disclosures over the Internet, but none have analyzed the
problem with the same depth and approach used in this Article.8 Moreover,
much of the literature addresses First Amendment challenges, with top
scholars arguing from both ends of the spectrum about the role of the First
Amendment in trade secret cases.9 I enter the discussion from a different
perspective, (ultimately landing somewhere near the middle of the spectrum
between those who would extend broad First Amendment protection to
anyone who posts trade secrets on the Internet and those who would protect
the status of trade secrets over First Amendment and Internet challenges).

8
See, e.g., Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182-83 (1996); Matthew R. Millikin, Note:
WWW.Misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the Internet, 78 Wash. U. L.
Q. 931 (2000); Ryan Lambrecht, Note: Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the
Information Age?, 18 Rev. Litig. 317 (1999); Daniel W. Park, Trade Secrets, The First Amendment, and Patent
Law: A Collision on the Information Superhighway, 10 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 46, 47 (2004); Victoria A. Cundiff,
Trade Secrets and The Internet: Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT
347, 355-59 (2005).
9
For those favoring trade secret protection over First Amendment rights see, e.g., Bruce T. Adkins,
Trading Secrets In the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151;
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Property
and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media, & Ent. L.J. 1, 5
(2001); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment
Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1003 (2000); Franklin B. Goldberg, Recent Developments: Ford Motor Co. v.
Lane, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 271 (2001); Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The Battle
Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 517 (2002).
For those advocating First Amendment rights over trade secret protection, see, e.g., David Greene, Trade
Secrets, the First Amendment, and the Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537
(2001); Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases,
48 Duke L.J. 147, 229-31 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L. Rev. 697, 739-48 (2003).

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

9

My objective is to articulate a workable test that courts can use
when deciding whether trade secrets that have been disclosed on the
Internet can still be preserved as secret, regardless of whether there is or is
not a First Amendment defense in the case. The Article critically examines
relevant trade secret doctrines, dissecting assumptions and methodically
examining whether it is possible to retain trade secret protection in the face
of a disclosure over the Internet. It also draws guidance from other areas of
law, and together this critical examination informs what I coin a sequential
preservation model. Accordingly, this model is a unique and novel
approach to the problem.10
The sequential preservation model calls for a threshold
determination of whether the information was entitled to trade secret
protection before the Internet disclosure. If and only if it was, then a three
factor test will be used to evaluate whether it retained the trade secret status,
and was ultimately misappropriated. Those three factors consider (1) the
amount of time the information was exposed on the Internet and the
promptness of any action by the trade secret owner to have the information

10
Attempts to address the problem effectively must take into consideration the various issues identified
in this paper, and tread a delicate balance, being ever mindful of the goals and constraints of trade secret law and
its interaction with other areas of law. To do otherwise may risk undermining the general principles of trade
secret law. The state of Nevada, for instance, enacted legislation in 2001 which provides that a trade secret that is
disseminated on the Internet shall remain a trade secret if the owner obtains an injunction to have it removed
within a “reasonable time.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.055 (2005). For a host of reasons discussed, infra, this
legislation is not well grounded. See sections V, VI, and VIII infra.
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removed, (2) the extent of the disclosure, and (3) the likelihood that the
recipient knew the information was trade secret.
Part II of the Article provides a background summary of trade
secret law. Part III summarizes the relevant case law in this area. Part IV
analyzes the third party disclosure problem. Insights from other areas of
law are provided in Parts V and VI. Part VII presents the proposed model
and the three factor test for analyzing these cases, followed by a theoretical
summary and application of the model in Part VIII. Part IX addresses
remedies available to a trade secret owner, and the Article concludes in Part
X.
II. TRADE SECRET LAW BACKGROUND
Unlike the other areas of intellectual property (copyrights, patents,
and trademarks), there is no federal statutory law governing trade secrets.
Rather, trade secrets are protected by state law. Most states have adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), and as a result there is some
uniformity in defining trade secrets and trade secret misappropriation.11
The states that have not adopted the UTSA tend to rely on common law
based on the Restatement of Torts.12 Finally, and more recently, the
11

It has been adopted in whole or part by forty-four states and Washington, D.C.

12

See Michael A. Epstein, Epstein on Intellectual Property, (4th ed.), 2005 Supplement, § 1.02 at 1-4.

The UTSA provides broader protection than the Restatement in that it does not require that a trade
secret be in use to be protected, and it protects negative information. A negative trade secret is the knowledge of
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Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition13 also addresses trade secrets.14
Its rules apply to actions under both the UTSA and the Restatement of
Torts.15

Most courts appear to rely on the definitions in the UTSA16 or in

the Restatement of Torts,17 and as such this Article will as well for most of
the analysis which follows.

what not to do or what doesn’t work, a lesson learned from a certain process or research and development effort
that failed. See James Pooley, Trade Secrets 4.02 [3] (1997).
13

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39-45 (1995).

14
This is an interesting shift in the overall treatment of this area of the law and it corresponds with the
growing union of trade secret and unfair competition issues becoming evident in the case law. For instance, unfair
competition claims involving trade secrets often mirror trade secret misappropriation claims. See, e.g., IBM v.
Seagate, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, at *11 (D. Minn. 1991; GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229
(D. Cal. 2001).

15

See Restatement of Unfair Competition § 39, Reporters’ Note (1995).

16
The UTSA defines a trade secret as information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
The UTSA requires only reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts, to protect the confidentiality of
trade secrets. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1987). See also Religious Tech.
Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (church made
reasonable efforts under UTSA to protect secrecy of religious documents, including: use of locked cabinets and
safes; logging in identification of materials; electronic sensors; alarms; photo identifications; security personnel;
and confidentiality agreements for all given access to materials).
17

See Michael A. Epstein, Epstein on Intellectual Property, (4th ed.), 2005 Supplement, § 1.02 at 1-4
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information, which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. Restatement (First) of Torts, § 757, cmt. (b) (1939), It may be a formula
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or
other device, or a list of customers. Id.
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A. Lawful Use of Another’s Trade Secrets
Unlike patent law which grants exclusive use to a patent holder, the
owner of a trade secret does not enjoy the same level of exclusivity.18 Not
only can the same information be considered a trade secret by more than
one owner, but not all use of a trade secret is an unlawful
misappropriation.19 Rather, only trade secrets that have been acquired
through improper discovery are unlawful.20

A trade secret owner may

grant permission to use a trade secret. Even without consent or permission,
however, a party may make lawful use of another’s trade secrets in three
main ways.
First, one who independently discovers or invents a trade secret is
entitled to use it.21 Second, one who actually reverse engineers a trade
secret (obtained fairly and honestly) is not subject to liability for trade
secret misappropriation.22 Finally, and most relevant to this Article, where
a party learns a trade secret through a disclosure that was not made in
18
See Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Mass. 1946) (“The owner of a trade secret, in
contradistinction to the owner of a patent, has no such right in the idea as will enable him to exclude others from
using it. Thus if one acquires a secret by honest means he may use it.” (citations omitted)).
19
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676
F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982).
20

See Kewanee., 416 U.S. at 496-97.

21

Id. at 476.

22

See, e.g., Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982) (locksmiths may reverse engineer
codes and then provide them for compilation); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (“It is
unquestionably lawful for a person to gain possession, through proper means, of his competitor’s product and,
through inspection and analysis, create a duplicate, unless, of course the item, is patented.”); Unif. Trade Secrets
Act, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (Commissioners’ Comment).
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breach of a contract or special relationship or with knowledge of such a
breach, she is entitled to use it.23 Thus, a trade secret owner has no
protection for a trade secret that is accidentally disclosed.24 Of even greater
significance is that once disclosed, the trade secret no longer exists as to
other parties because the requisite level of secrecy cannot be met.25

B. Equitable Nature of Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law is the branch of intellectual property law that most
closely regulates standards of commercial ethics, guides morality of the
business world, and underscores fair dealing.26 It is probably in part for this
reason that trade secret law is now codified in the Restatement of Unfair
Competition rather than in the Restatement of Torts.27 Its equitable nature
is evident in most court opinions, as judges struggle to decide that which is

23

See Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, cmt. a. (1939).

24
See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 1980) (“even a
bona fide trade secret is not protected against discovery by fair means, including accidental disclosure”).
25
See Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972) (“Once the secret is published to the
‘whole world,’ . . . it loses its protected status and becomes available to others for use and copying without fear of
legal reprisal from the original possessor.”)
26
See, e.g., 416 U.S. at 481-82; Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law 1.05, at 1-15 (1997); Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition 39 cmt. A (1995).
27
Although the precise reason for this change is not explicitly stated, perhaps it is because trade secret
law is inextricably tied to the values of our competitive marketplace. As the authors note, “the law of trade secrets
. . . reflects the accommodation of numerous interests, including the trade secret owner's claim to protection
against the defendant's bad faith or improper conduct, the right of competitors and others to exploit information
and skills in the public domain, and the interest of the public in encouraging innovation and in securing the
benefits of vigorous competition.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. b (1995). See James J.
Mulcahy and Joy M. Tassin, Is PepsiCo the Choice of the Next Generation: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
and its Place in New York Jurisprudence, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 233 (2003).
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fair to the parties by assessing, sometimes impliedly, such elements as good
faith, honesty, and fair dealing.28
Consistent with these underlying ethical and equitable approaches,
all three statutory frameworks of trade secret law described above prohibit
the use of improper means to acquire trade secrets.29 This is not an
insignificant fact, and should be crucial to analyzing the third party problem
presented in this Article. Thus, the extent to which acquisition of another’s
trade secrets over the Internet involved “improper means”30 by both the
original misappropriator and the third party user ought to be the central
inquiry once the threshold question has been answered.

28
See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The essence of the tort of
trade secret misappropriation is the inequitable use of the secret”); see also Northern Petrochemical Co. v.
Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973).
29
Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, cmt. a (1939).; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 449.;
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 40 (1995).

30
“Improper means” under the UTSA includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of
a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 1 (1985).
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III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
The cases below are representative of the trade secret disclosure
problem. They reflect the courts’ attempts to wrestle with the bright line
rule against protecting non-secret information and the equitable
considerations underlying trade secret law. The cases also reveal the range
of potential actors who could expose secrets, from insiders (like employees)
to outsiders who purportedly are motivated by the public interest.

A. The Church of Scientology Cases
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma31, Lerma, a disgruntled
former member of the Church of Scientology, published documents taken
from a court record onto the Internet.32 The Church33 considered these
documents to be trade secrets and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order
prohibiting Lerma from publishing the alleged trade secrets.34 The Church
also sued The Washington Post for publishing a story related to and quoting
the allegedly trade secret documents.35

The court, granted summary

judgment in favor of the Post on the trade secret misappropriation claims,
31

908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).

32

Id. at 1364.

33
The Religious Technology Center is a non-profit corporation formed by the Church of Scientology to
protect it its religious course materials. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 823 F. Supp. 1231, 1239
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
34

908 F. Supp. at 1364.

35

908 F. Supp. at 1365. The Post had obtained the documents from Lerma and from the court file.
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reasoning in part that the documents no longer qualified as trade secrets.36
The court was not moved by the fact that the church had taken extraordinary
measures to keep the documents secret, including having a Church member
sign out the court file on a daily basis.37
In another Scientology case, the Church sought an injunction against
another disgruntled former member who posted Church writings on several
USENET groups.38 In examining the Church’s claim that the writings were
trade secrets, the court stated that while the defendant could not rely on his
own improper posting of the writings to the Internet to support the argument
that the writings were no longer secrets, evidence that an unrelated third
party posted them would result in a loss of secrecy and a loss of trade secret
rights.39 The court held that since the writings were posted on the Internet,
they were generally available to the relevant public and there was no trade
secret right available to support an injunction.40
In a motion six months later, the Church again sought an injunction
on trade secret grounds, this time introducing consumer surveys to show

36

Id. at 1369.

37

Id. at 1365.

38

Netcom, 823 F. Supp. at 1239.

39

Id. at 1256.

40

Id. at 1256-57.
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that the writings were not generally known.41 The court struck the surveys
as irrelevant because they were surveys of the general public and not of the
Church’s competitors.42

However, the court retreated from its earlier

statement that posting to the Internet destroys trade secret protection.43
Instead, the court announced that a determination of trade secret protection
“requires a review of the circumstances surrounding the posting and
consideration of the interests of the trade secret owner, the policies favoring
competition and the interests, including first amendment rights,[sic] of
innocent third parties who acquire information off the Internet.”44 Because
the trade secret status of the Church’s documents was an open question
under this new test, the court granted a preliminary injunction.45
B. DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner
In DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner,46 the plaintiff association
developed an encryption program called CSS to limit the copying of DVD’s
by DVD players and computers that could decrypt CSS.47 The plaintiff
alleged that by reverse engineering plaintiff’s program, a Norwegian teen
41

Religious technology Center v. Netcom, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, *24 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

42

Id. at *26.

43

Id. at *40-*41.

44

Id. at *41.

45

Id. at *42.

46

93 Cal.App.4th 648 (6th App. 2001).

47

Id. at 652.
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created a program called DeCSS that allowed encrypted DVD’s to be
played on any DVD player or computer.48 Defendant Bunner found and
posted that program on the Internet for anyone to use.49 The plaintiff filed a
suit for injunctive relief to prevent Bunner from posting or linking to the
DeCSS program on the Internet.50 The court noted that Bunner’s reverse
engineering did not qualify as using improper means to acquire trade
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, but that Bunner disclosed
trade secrets he knew or should have known were proprietary information.51
However, the court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that it would
be a prior restraint of pure speech.52
The court held that traditional intellectual property exceptions to the
prior restraint doctrine do not apply since Bunner did not actually use the
information or breach a contractual obligation.53 After an appeal by the
California Supreme Court, which held that an injunction would not violate
the First Amendment if there was a trade secret,54 the court was asked on

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 653.

51

Id. at 660.

52

DVD Copy Control Assoc., 93 Cal.App.4th at 664.

53

Id.

54

DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 875 (2003).
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remand to determine whether a trade secret still existed.55 The court noted
that widespread publication of a trade secret over the Internet will destroy
its status as a trade secret.56 However, the court went on further to reason
that the information retains its value to the creator if the Internet publication
is sufficiently obscure or transient so that it does not become generally
known to those who would consider it valuable.57 The court rejected
plaintiff’s public policy arguments for protecting trade secrets, holding that
allowing injunctions once a trade secret has become public could
theoretically put the entire general public at risk for liability.58 Since the
trade secret had been widely disseminated, an injunction would not prevent
any further harm from occurring to the plaintiff, so the court denied the
injunction.59

55

DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 116 Cal.App.4th 241, 245 (6th App. 2004).

56

Id. at 251.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 253.

59

Id. at 255.
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C. United States v. Genovese
In United States v. Genovese,60 defendant Genovese was charged
with offering Microsoft source code for sale on the Internet in violation of
the Economic Espionage Act of 199661 (“EEA”).62 Genovese challenged
the indictment on the grounds that the statute, which makes downloading
and selling a trade secret a crime, violated the First Amendment.63 The
court noted that the First Amendment protects computer source code and
other trade secrets, but held that the First Amendment does not protect
conduct such as trying to convert a trade secret for economic gain.64
Genovese also made a due process challenge arguing that criminalizing the
download and sale of trade secrets under the statute was vague because he
could not have known the source code was not generally known or that
Microsoft took reasonable measures to protect it.65 However, the court held
that under the EEA, a trade secret does not lose its protection when
“temporarily, accidentally, or illicitly released to the public, provided it

60

409 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D. N.Y. 2005).

61
The Act provided the first comprehensive criminal federal trade secrets law on trade secret theft and
misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (1996). The EEA criminalizes “theft of trade secrets” Id. at § 1832(a).
and economic espionage for the benefit of a foreign government, instrumentality or agent. In order to state a
claim under the Act for theft of trade secrets, the government must establish that the defendant knowingly stole, or
obtained information that was trade secret without authorization. Id. at § 1832 (a).
62

409 F. Supp. 2d at 254.

63

Id. at 256.

64

Id. at ¶8.

65

Id. at ¶11.
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The court observed that since

Genovese sold the source code, it still retained some value and was not
generally known.67
IV. ANALYZING THE THIRD PARTY PROBLEM
This Article tackles the problem which arises when an independent68
third party discovers another’s trade secrets on the Internet and uses or
intends to use it. The trade secret owner has misappropriation claims
against the original misappropriator.69 If the original misappropriator did
not post the information himself, then whoever posted the information may
also be liable.70 As against an independent third party who comes upon the

66

Genovese, 409 F. Supp. at ¶12.

67

Id. at ¶13.

68
One who is independent of and has no connection or involvement with the original misappropriator of
the trade secret.
69

The UTSA defines "misappropriation," as:

(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew, or had reason to know, that his knowledge of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from, or through, a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or,
(III) derived from, or through, a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 449.
70
To the extent one has exhibited discretion, akin to that of a magazine or newspaper publisher, in
deciding to disclose a trade secret, then she may be liable. O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006
WL 1452685 at *21 (Cal. App. May 26, 2006) (noting that disclosure of confidential information about a
company may expose a reporter or editor to liability). See also notes 222-225 and accompanying text infra.
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information once posted, however, it is unclear whether the trade secret
owner has any remedies under trade secret law to prevent use of the
information.
Indeed, the current status of trade secret law would suggest that the
third party is entitled to use information she obtained from the public
domain, assuming that she did not employ improper means to obtain the
trade secret, has no knowledge that it was obtained by improper means, or is
not bound by any contractual or special relationship with the trade secret
owner.71 However, that initial conclusion necessarily makes several
underlying assumptions about trade secret law and Internet publication.
Among these assumptions are that (i) the information was not a
trade secret at the time it was discovered (ii) the fact that information
appeared on the Internet makes it public, generally known, and readily
ascertainable, and (iii) the discovery was not through improper means.
This section will dissect each assumption to analyze whether it is reasonable
to conclude that the trade secret owner is not likely to prevail against an
independent third party either because the information was not trade secret
at the time it reached the third party or because even if the information is
determined to be trade secret it was not misappropriated by the third party.
71

See Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972)(reasoning that there can be no
recovery against those who are “not misappropriators in the first instance, or possessors of the secret by virtue of
learning it from the misappropriator(s) with knowledge that it was stolen.”)
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The succeeding two sections will then turn for guidance to a broader view
outside of trade secret law, followed by the proposed model.

A. Is it a trade secret?
The first hurdle, and first step, to a trade secret owner whose
proprietary information has been discovered on the Internet, is proving that
the information has not lost its trade secret status by virtue of its publication
in this medium. While in the typical misappropriation case a trade secret
owner must prove that the information is the type of information that is
protectable under trade secret law, and that she took reasonable steps to
maintain its secrecy, the Internet publication problem presented here is
complicated by additional layers of proof. This is primarily because the
third party (vis a vis, for instance, a former employee who discloses an
employer’s trade secrets) would not be breaching any contract or duty to the
trade secret owner, and would have discovered the information in an
arguably public place.72
Given the factual scenario presented here, the relevant applicable
requirements from the UTSA’s73 definition of trade secret are that the

72
In cases where the information has previously or simultaneously become available by other means
other than the Internet, it makes it even more difficult for the trade secret owner to attempt to argue that it should
be protected. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (D. Colo.
1995) (noting that the information had been available in an unsealed court file).
73
I rely on the UTSA because it has been adopted by a majority of the states, and because it’s trade
secret definition is consistent with both the Rest. of Torts and the Rest. of Unfair Competition definitions.
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information (i) not be generally known and (ii) not be readily ascertainable
by proper means.74 This leads to further inquiry as to whether a posting on
the Internet is “generally known” and “readily ascertainable” and whether
locating such information via the Internet constitutes “proper means.”
Because of the nature of the Internet, and the relatively unique (to
trade secret law) problem presented in this Article, it is important to identify
the accurate point in time at which the trade secret status of the information
should be determined, and the party from whose perspective the relevant
inquiry should be made. One possibility is to consider whether at the time
the defendant (independent third party) came upon the information, it was a
trade secret. Another option is to consider whether the information was
trade secret before it was misappropriated by the wrongdoer. The former is
a pre-misappropriation perspective, while the latter is a postmisappropriation perspective. The post-misappropriation perspective seems
more consistent with trade secret law and the manner in which
misappropriation cases are generally analyzed. To be sure, it is not the
more favorable perspective for a trade secret owner, because it lends itself
to a more ephemeral view of trade secrets, where despite a trade secret

74

UTSA § 1

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

25

owner’s best efforts it may lose trade secret protection due to the
intervening acts of a bad actor.75
Although the additional layer presented here, of an independent
third party discovering information on the Internet from a misappropriator,
is missing from the typical two-party trade secret case, there does not seem
to be sufficient reason to diverge from the same analysis. In other words, in
a situation where an employee steals an employer’s trade secrets we would
ask whether the information was trade secret at the time the employee took
possession of it. Similarly, with an independent third party, it seems logical
to consider whether at the time she discovered the information it was a trade
secret. Put in criminal terminology, in order to be guilty of stealing a trade
secret, the information must have been a trade secret at the time in which
the defendant came in possession of it.

75
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 901 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno, J.
concurring) (“[E]ven when a trade secret holder acts with perfect diligence, it has no action against the republisher
of no-longer-secret information who does not act in privity with the original misappropriator.”).
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1. Is a Posting on the Internet “Generally Known”?
It is axiomatic that publicly available information cannot qualify for
trade secret status.76 Given our understanding of the Internet, it has become
an implicit assumption that any information posted on the Internet77 is
public.78 “[T]he act of ‘posting’ constitutes publication to the world.”79 If
“generally known” is synonymous with public, then it might explain why
many courts assume that a trade secret posted on the Internet has become
generally known. However, exploration below the surface of these
assumptions merely leads to further questions. For instance, does it matter
if the information is “known” or “knowable” to competitors? Does public
mean public accessibility or public publication? Does the obscurity of the
website matter, or are all Internet postings equal? An attempt to answer
these questions will be forthcoming after we further dissect the legal
definition of a trade secret.

76
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is public knowledge
or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Copr., 416 U.S.
470, 475 (1974) (“The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a
general knowledge in the trade or business.”).
77
Note that in some circumstances there can be various levels of access to a website, ranging from
publicly available portions to those that are restricted to authorized users with passwords. However, this
discussion assumes an independent third party has accessed information from a publicly available site, or
legitimately through a more restrictive site. See, e.g., Inventory Locator Service, LLC v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 022695MA/V, 2005 WL 2179185, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005) (discussing a website with four levels of
access).
78
See generally Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2006) (Internet
publication is form of “aggregate communication” intended for broad public audience similar to print media);
Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, (D.C.Cir.2005) (trade secrets posted on
FDA website available to public); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2003) (when people
post information to website available to public, they distribute it).
79

O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *13 (Cal. App. May 26, 2006).
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The comments to the UTSA provide guidance in that they make
clear that “generally known” does not necessarily mean known by the
general public. 80 Indeed, a trade secret can be “generally known” if it is
known by at least one person who can obtain economic benefit from the
information.81 It would therefore seem more precise to say that information
cannot be a trade secret if it is known (delete “generally”) by the relevant
people82 (i.e. those who may benefit from it).83 Accordingly, it is difficult
to challenge the emergent conclusion that “posting works to the Internet
makes them ‘generally known’ to the relevant people.”84 Even though that
conclusion makes legal sense, from an equitable perspective, it seems unfair
to a trade secret owner that illegal conduct by another could destroy a
heretofore well preserved trade secret.
The case law demonstrates courts’ uneasiness with a bright line rule
in that area, implying to this author the courts’ instinctive, albeit unstated,
concern for fairness and the equitable nature of trade secret law. One trial
court, concerned about the incentives to wrongdoers, found that the mere

80

See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (1990).

81

Id.

82
This does not include people to whom the trade secret owner has disclosed the trade secret pursuant to
a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.
83

See Religious Technology Ctr. v.. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23572, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1997); DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93
(2004).
84

RTC v. Netcom, 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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posting of information on the Internet does not destroy a trade secret.85
According to the court, “[t]o hold otherwise would do nothing less than
encourage misappropriaters [sic] of trade secrets to post the fruits of their
wrongdoing on the Internet as quickly as possible and as widely as possible
thereby destroying a trade secret forever.”86
Another court was willing to recognize that a publication on the
Internet does not automatically terminate the existence of a trade secret, and
considered the amount of time the information was posted and thus
available for inspection. To that court, where the posting is “sufficiently
obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not become
generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors or other
persons to whom the information would have some economic value” the
trade secret status is preserved.87 The precise measure of obscurity or
transience required to protect the trade secret, however, is unsettled.
In the Religious Technology Center cases, one of the courts noted
that the fact that the information had been posted on the Internet for ten
days, made it publicly available (destroying trade secret protection) because
during those ten days they were potentially available to millions of Internet
85

See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241.

86

Id. at 249.

87

Id. at 251.
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users.88 According to that court, “[o]nce a trade secret is posted on the
Internet, it is effectively part of the public domain, impossible to retrieve.”89
In another one of those related cases, the court was wary of making the
“overly broad generalization” that posting works to the Internet would
destroy their trade secret status.90 Instead, the court recommended
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the posting.91 The model
presented here espouses precisely that kind of review of the factual
circumstances in an attempt to decide on a case by case basis whether,
among other things, the generally known standard has been met.
2. Is a Posting on the Internet “Readily Ascertainable”?
It is interesting that the drafters of the UTSA chose a conjunctive
between “generally known” and “readily ascertainable.” This necessarily
implies that they have separate meaning. However, in practice courts seem
to struggle with the difficulty of determining the meaning of these labels,92
and more often simply do not consider the readily ascertainable prong as a
separate factor but instead appear to collapse it into the generally known

88

Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995).

89

Id. at 1368.

90

RTC v. Netcom, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1997).

91

Id.

92
See, e.g., U.S. v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp.2d 623, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“What is ‘generally known’ and
‘reasonably ascertainable’ about ideas, concepts, and technology is constantly evolving in the modern age”); see
also MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp.2d 396, 417 (E.D. Va. 2004)(“What constitutes
readily ascertainable through proper means is heavily fact dependent and simply boils down to assessing the ease
with which a trade secret could have been independently discovered”).
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prong. Indeed, some states that have adopted the UTSA have chosen to
remove “readily ascertainable” altogether from their definition of trade
secret.93 Even without this trend, under the circumstances presented here
attempting to satisfy both “generally known” and “readily ascertainable”
does appear redundant. Given the nature of the Internet the meanings may
converge, and one could posit that every Internet posting is generally
known and readily ascertainable, or is generally available and thus readily
ascertainable.
In the context of the Internet, treating the two concepts the same
does not appear problematic. The very nature of the Internet, that it allows
equal access to anyone with a computer, irrespective of certain traditional
limitations to accessing information, like geography and cost, means that it
makes information at least readily discoverable, if not ascertainable.94
Moreover, considering that the relevant population consists of those who
could obtain economic benefit from the information, it is logical that these
arguably motivated individuals would be the very persons surfing the
Internet for information that would afford them a competitive advantage.

93
See, e.g., Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(2), cmt re 1984 addition (West 1997) (explaining that the
phrase was removed because it was “viewed as ambiguous in the definition of of a trade secret,” but that “the
assertion that a matter is readily ascertainable by proper means remains available as a defense to a claim of
misappropriation.”).

94

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000)
defines ascertainable as “to discover with certainty, as through examination or experimentation.’
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Earlier in this section I posed certain questions which, by virtue of
having dissected the definition of trade secret in the context of the Internet,
may now be easier to answer. First, if courts continue to treat “generally
known” and “readily ascertainable” interchangeably, then it does not seem
to make a significant difference whether the information is “known” or
“knowable” to competitors. The former would fall under the “generally
known” category, and the latter, i.e., whether it is knowable would be
captured under the “readily ascertainable” category.
The practical reality may be that the information will be known by
at least one person, typically the named defendant in the law suit. That
defendant will likely argue that the information is not trade secret because
the nature of the Internet is such that others have very likely accessed the
information as well. This raises another interesting question as to whether it
is the trade secret owner’s burden of production to show that others have
not accessed the information, or the defendant’s to show the opposite. If
posting information on the Internet makes it discoverable by and thus
knowable to the relevant public, then the mere fact that the information is
accessible to others may be sufficient to destroy secrecy even without proof
of direct knowledge or access. Accordingly, even when the trade secret
owner does not necessarily know whether any specific competitors or others
have accessed the information it may nonetheless have lost trade secret
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protection. This approaches the bright line rule that publication in and of
itself extinguishes the trade secret.
In further response to the questions posed, as between public
accessibility and public publication the inquiry is the same, and indeed, in
the context of the Internet may be one and the same. A posting on the
Internet, compared to, for instance, a disclosure in a report sitting on an
office shelf,95 is both a publication96 and a publicly accessible publication.
Thus, to the extent, generally known and readily ascertainable are
synonymous, then the mere publication of a trade secret on the Internet and
its ensuing accessibility would destroy the secret.
Finally, the many angles of the analysis seem to lead to the
inexorable conclusion that a posting on the Internet would most likely
defeat any trade secret protection. However, this may be true only if one
accepts that all Internet postings are created equal. If, however,
consideration of the obscurity of or accessibility to the website as well as
timing and amount of exposure effect the “generally known” or “readily
ascertainable” prongs, then perhaps a different conclusion might be

95
Such a report is arguably not publicly accessible. Cf. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(finding in a patent case that a thesis in a college library that was not indexed or catalogued was not sufficiently
publicly accessible to constitute a published prior art reference.)
96

See, e.g., O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *24-25 (Cal. App.
May 26, 2006) (analyzing why Internet web sites are publications).

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

33

possible. The factors presented later in this paper attempt to accommodate
this possibility.

B. Is it Misappropriation?
Having proved that the information is trade secret, or likely to be
trade secret, the second hurdle to a trade secret owner whose proprietary
information has been discovered on the Internet, is proving
misappropriation. This is difficult because on the surface the presence of
the independent third party who has no duty to the trade secret owner to
maintain his secret coupled with the public place discovery does not seem
actionable. The view that any wrong to a trade secret owner occurs only at
the time of the improper acquisition stems from an underlying construct of
trade secret law that does not treat a trade secret as property.97 Rather, the
presence of a confidential relationship or good faith is a necessary
prerequisite, and it is that breach that triggers something akin to an
enforceable property right in the trade secret.98 The key factors then appear
to be whether the information was discovered by improper means and
whether the third party should have known it was discovered by improper
means.
97

The Restatement of Torts rejects the concept of a property interest in a trade secret, grounding trade
secret protection on a general duty of good faith. Restatement of Torts 757 cmt. a (1939).
98

See Lockridge, 209 Kan. at 395-96 (discussing why the misappropriation of trade secret is not a
continuing wrong).
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All three trade secret statutory frameworks include improper means
in defining misappropriation.99 The relevant provision from the UTSA
appears to make a third party liable for misappropriation if he or she “knew
or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was
derived from one who used improper means to acquire it. . .”100 This
necessarily suggests a fact intensive determination into the third party’s
state of mind, her level of knowledge that the information was trade secret
and that it was acquired by improper means.
With respect to third parties, not only does the Restatement of Torts
define misappropriation to include a notice requirement when disclosure is
intentional, but also when the disclosure “was made to him by mistake.”101
This raises an interesting question as to whose mistake one should consider.
Arguably the original misappropriator who published the information
intended to do so, and thus did not do so by mistake. On the other hand, the
trade secret owner could argue that it was a mistake because he or she did
not intend to disclose the trade secret. It is also unclear from the
Restatement’s definition whether “notice of the fact” that the information is
secret is judged at the time the trade secret is discovered, or at a later time

99

See note 29 supra.

100

Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 16 U.L.A. 449.
The Rest. of Torts and Restatement of Unfair Competition definitions are consistent with the UTSA.

101

Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939).
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when the trade secret owner provides such notice to the defendant. The
cases seem to suggest the former.102
It is worth considering whether the manner in which the third party
obtained the information over the Internet is (or should be) “improper
means.” The phrase certainly captures unlawful conduct,103 but it has also
been interpreted to cover lawful conduct.104 For the purposes of this
problem, the assumption is that the third party is not a hacker and has
merely accessed the information through a search engine or through another
site to which she has legitimate access. Accordingly, even given a broad
interpretation of improper means, it would seem very unlikely that this kind
of searching, in and of itself, would constitute improper means.105 The end
result would appear to be that a defendant who does not know or have
reason to know that the information is trade secret cannot be liable for
misappropriation. As one court reasoned:
Although the person who originally posted a trade secret on
the Internet may be liable for trade secret misappropriation,
the party who merely downloads Internet information cannot
102
See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 164 (3rd Cir. 1982) (noting that the
defendant “had reason to know, and in fact knew, that the drawings were secret when he obtained them, and that
their release to him was improper.”) See also discussion infra in section VIII (B)( 3) regarding notice.
103
Improper means under the UTSA includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 1 (1985).
104

105

See, e.g., National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 35-36 (Mo. 1966).

See RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1369 (“It is the employment of improper means to procure the trade
secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of [liability]”).
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be liable for misappropriation because there is no
misconduct involved in interacting with the Internet.106
It is noteworthy that for most courts the question whether there was
misappropriation comes back to the preliminary consideration of whether
the information qualifies as a trade secret. 107 This is perfectly logical,
given that one cannot misappropriate that which is not a trade secret. This
observation helps inform the model presented in this paper, since the
preliminary consideration of the protectable status of the information is
inescapable. However, once determined in the affirmative, it must be
divorced from the other factors in order to avoid a tautology and permit a
clearer, more distinct analysis of the issues.
V. OTHER OBSTACLES TO TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
In addition to the hurdles to preserving the trade secret status of
arguably public information within trade secret law, there are further
barriers from other areas of law that may also be implicated by the analysis.
Both constitutional law and patent law concerns lean toward prohibiting
restrictions on the use of publicly available information. The applicable
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Patent Law doctrines are
summarized below.
106

RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 at 1368.

107
See, e.g. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 251 (“[I]f the allegedly proprietary information contained in
DeCSS was already public knowledge when Bunner posted the program to this web site, Bunner could not be
liable for misappropriation by republishing it because he would not have been disclosing a trade secret.”)
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A. First Amendment
Defendants in these types of cases have asserted a First Amendment
right to disclose allegedly trade secret information discovered on the
Internet.108 “[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits limitations, absent
some extraordinary showing of governmental interest, on the publication of
information already made public.”109 When weighing the jealously guarded
First Amendment rights against the commercial interests in protecting trade
secrets, courts are often reluctant to enjoin disclosures of trade secrets.110
By implication, it would seem that if the First Amendment always trumps
an owner’s right to protect against disclosure, then trade secret law would
be powerless to enforce non-disclosure agreements or otherwise prevent
disclosure of their secret information. Accordingly, the California Supreme
Court has rejected a similar argument and made clear that an injunction
against disclosure of information that qualifies as trade secret does not
violate the First Amendment.111

108
For further discussion about the First Amendment in this context see generally Ryan Lambrecht, Note:
Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 Rev. Litig. 317
(1999).
109

Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 900 (Moreno, J., concurring).

110
See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)(refusing to enjoin
publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in violation of a protective order, noting, ‘[t]he private litigants’
interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing
a prior restraint.”)
111

DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 889 (2003).
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Nonetheless, the obvious hole remains: where a trade secret has
been disclosed (and thus no longer qualifies as a trade secret under current
trade secret law) the First Amendment could protect the disclosure.112 This
returns full circle to the ever critical determination whether information,
once posted on the Internet, loses its trade secret status. A positive response
to that question leads to the likely conclusion that the information, for a
whole host of reasons, including the First Amendment, can be used freely.
Furthermore, in the absence of a fiduciary duty or confidentiality
agreement not to publish trade secret information, one court has ruled that
the First Amendment prevails. In Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,113 the defendant
operated a website with news about Ford and its products.114 Lane received
confidential Ford documents from an anonymous source, and initially
agreed not to disclose most of the information.115

However, Lane

eventually published some documents on his website relating to the quality
of Ford’s products, thinking that the public had a right to know.116 He did
so despite knowing that the documents were confidential.117 Ford sought a

112

See id. at 876.

113

Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).

114

Id. at 747.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 748.
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restraining order to prevent publication of the documents, claiming the
documents were trade secrets.118 The court acknowledged (without any
discussion) that Ford could show Lane had misappropriated its trade secrets,
but reversed the order on First Amendment grounds, considering an
injunction to prevent Lane from publishing trade secrets a prior restraint.119
Despite evidence that Lane had used the Internet and the confidential
material to extort Ford, the court noted that Ford’s trade secrets were not
more important than the documents in the Pentagon Papers case and not
more inflammatory than the article in the Near case.120 Since a prior
restraint was not justified in either of those cases, a prior restraint could not
be justified in this case.121
B. Fourth Amendment
Further constitutionally based obstacles to restricting use of publicly
available information lies in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Some
scholars have explored analogies between Fourth Amendment privacy
interests and the secrecy requirement of trade secret law.122 As specifically

118

Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 748.

119

Id. at 750.

120
Id. at 752-53 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 91 S. Ct.
2140 (1971) and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931)).
121

Id. at 753.

122
See, e.g., Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182-83 (1996); Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A CostBenefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 461, 465-66 (1992).
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related to the issues presented in this paper, however, a rule that trade
secrets posted on the Internet lose their protection is consistent with and
analogous to court interpretation of Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
In particular, when a person unlawfully invades one’s zone of privacy to
steal private, incriminating information and then reveals that information to
the police or the public, courts have held that this conduct does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.123 The fact that trade secret law similarly provides
incentives to break the law, is thus not a unique concept.124
C. Patent Law
Any attempts to restrict use of information found in the public
domain are outside the purview of trade secret law, and instead are covered
by patent law. It is patent law that governs property rights in publicly
known information. The underlying premise is that “all ideas in general
circulation [is] dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent.”125 Accordingly, attempts to use state trade secret law to

123
See generally Rodney A. Smolia, Information As Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for
Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1135-36 (2002)(discussing the “silver platter” doctrine which
permits an independent agent to break the law to obtain incriminating evidence, and turn that evidence over to law
enforcement on a “silver platter.”)
124

Unlike the Fourth Amendment “silver platter” cases, however, which justify such incentives by
arguing that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes government action, an analogous rationale in trade secret law
is not as strongly supported. See id. at 1136.
125

Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481.
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restrict use of information in the public domain are preempted by patent
law.126
Patent law further lends support to the idea that the intervening
illegal act of a misappropriator could negatively affect the rights of the
owner. The two cases discussed below make clear that even when a
misappropriator steals an invention while it is a trade secret, and then
unbeknownst to the inventor, puts it on sale or uses it publicly one year
before the inventor files a patent application on the invention, that use or
sale prevents the inventor from obtaining a patent.
In Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,127 plaintiff Lorenz sued
defendant Colgate for a declaration that Lorenz’s soap manufacture patent
was valid and Colgate’s was void.128 Lorenz alleged that he disclosed the
invention to Colgate, and that disclosure gave Lorenz priority over the
invention.129 Colgate asserted that its use of the patented process more than
a year before Lorenz filed the patent application rendered Lorenz’s patent
invalid under prior public use.130 Lorenz in turn argued that prior use does
126
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989) (“That which is
published may be freely copied as a matter of federal right.”); Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 255 (“[T]hat which is
in the public domain cannot be removed by action of the sates under the guise of trade secret protection.”)
127

167 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1948).

128

Id. at 423-24.

129

Id. at 424.

130

Id.
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not apply when an invention is “pirated” by another person.131 However,
the court held that the prior public use statute had no exceptions, and any
intervening public use bars the inventor from obtaining a patent.132 The
court stated that the policy behind the statute was to protect the public’s
interest, and therefore it was up to the inventor to protect his discovery from
being used.133
In Evans Cooling Systems, Inc. v. General Motors,134 plaintiff Evans
filed suit against defendant General Motors (“GM”) for infringing Evans’
patent on engine cooling.135 GM moved to declare the patent invalid on the
basis that GM sold cars with the invention before Evans sought a patent, but
Evans asserted that GM stole his engine cooling invention and allowed
dealers to sell vehicles containing the invention, and GM therefore should
not be able to invalidate the patent.136 After reviewing prior case law, the
court concluded that since the public use by the dealers of the invention was
innocent, the public bar use should apply.137

131

Id. at 426.

132

Id. at 429.

133

Lorenz, 167 F.2d at 429.

134

125 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

135

Id. at 1450.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 1454. However, the court noted that if GM did misappropriate the invention, Evans could still
sue for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id.
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VI. ASSISTANCE FROM ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE CASES
Despite the seemingly uphill battle in trying to preserve the trade
secret status of information disclosed on the Internet, one area of law
provides some hope, even if only by analogy. Cases involving inadvertent
disclosure of materials protected by the attorney client privilege are in some
ways analogous to the trade secret problem identified here. As the
summary below reveals, the courts tend to protect the privileged status of
the information especially where the necessary precautions were taken and
the disclosure occurred inadvertently or through misconduct. Thus, even
where confidentiality of the materials may have been lost, the privilege can
be preserved. Although there is no direct parallel to trade secret law in that
once secrecy is lost, the trade secret status is also lost, the model presented
here attempts to capture the spirit of those cases by recognizing that there
may be certain exceptional circumstances where trade secret status may be
retained.
A. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley and Co
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley and Co.,138
Berkley moved to suppress some evidence stolen by a former employee

138

466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
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from a grand jury, asserting it was protected by attorney-client privilege.139
The court initially held that attorney-client privilege historically does not
apply to stolen or lost documents as a matter of law.140 On motion to
reconsider, the court noted that the more modern approach is that when
attorneys and clients take reasonable precautions to ensure confidentiality,
the attorney-client privilege is not lost.141 Since the former Berkley
employee stole the documents, the court held that the theft is analogous to
an attorney disclosing privileged information in bad faith, which does not
result in a loss of privileged status under modern precedent.142
B. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Clayton J. Dean143
In this case the Washington Post published excerpts from an
Authority to Sue Memorandum prepared by plaintiff Resolution Trust
Corp.’s (“RTC”) counsel.144 When defendant Symington moved to order
discovery of the memo, RTC asserted the attorney-client privilege.145
Symington argued that the privilege was waived when it was leaked to the

139

Id. at 865.

140

Id. at 868 (citing 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2325 (McNaughton rev.1961)).

141

Id. at 869.

142

Id.

143

813 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Ariz. 1993).

144

Id. at 1427.

145

Id. at 1428.

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

45

newspaper unless RTC could prove it was stolen.146 Citing Berkley, the
court rejected Symington’s argument, and noted that disclosure of the
memo was a criminal act.147 The court held that since RTC proved they
took precautions to ensure the memo’s confidentiality, they established that
the release of the memo was not voluntary and that they did not waive the
attorney-client privilege of the memo.148
C. C.P. Smith v. Armour Pharmaceuticals
In C.P. Smith v. Armour Pharm.,149 defendant Miles, Inc.
inadvertently included a document from in-house counsel in a document
production given to plaintiff Smith.150 When Smith’s lawyer subsequently
leaked the document to the press, and accounts of the document appeared in
newspapers from Florida to Alaska, Miles filed a protective order, asserting
attorney-client privilege to the documents.151 The court noted that wide
circulation of a document is not, by itself, grounds for revoking attorneyclient privilege. 152 The court found a distinction between the document

146

Id.

147

Id. at 1429 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869-70
(D. NM. 1979)).
148

Resolution Trust Corp., 813 F. Supp. at 1429-30.

149

838 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1993).

150

Id. at 1575.

151

Id.

152

Id.
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losing its confidentiality and losing its privilege, stating that a document can
retain its privilege even if it is no longer confidential.153 Even though the
document was no longer confidential, since Miles did not waive the
attorney-client privilege, the document still retained the privilege.154
D. United States ex rel. Jerry Mayman v. Martin Marietta155
The government sought access to attorney-client privileged
documents in this case via a discovery request, asserting that defendant
Martin Marietta waived the privilege by allowing a former employee to
possess a draft of the document.156 The court found that whoever gave the
privileged documents to the former employee was not authorized to have
them, the former employee was not authorized to keep them and made false
statements to keep them.157 Since the confidentiality of the documents was
breached due to the unauthorized actions of a former employee, the court
refused to conclude reasonable precautions were not taken, and held the
privilege was not waived.158

153

Id.

154

C.P. Smith, 838 F. Supp. at 1577.

155

886 F. Supp. 1243 (D. My. 1995).

156

Id. at 1244.

157

Id. at 1245-46.

158

Id. at 1246.
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VII. THE SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION MODEL
The complexity of the problem presented here lies not necessarily in
the analytical framework of trade secret law available for determining
whether information is deserving of trade secret protection. Rather, it is the
recognition of the injustice that could result from strict application of the
law, and the ensuing incentives for illegal conduct, that is disturbing. Given
the equity rationale underlying trade secret law, these concerns compel an
exploration for a more just result. There is an underlying recognition that
perhaps something more than a bright line rule may be appropriate in some
cases.
With that in mind, I propose what I will coin a sequential
preservation model below as a tool to achieve a fairer result in those limited
cases where the injustice would otherwise be especially grave. When
properly applied, the factors should provide relief in extraordinary
circumstances. For the vast majority of cases, however, the default rule
under the current trade secret framework should apply. Publication of trade
secrets via the Internet will cause a loss of trade secret protection. This may
appear harsh in some circumstances, but trade secret owners have a duty to
be vigilant, and having chosen this method of intellectual property
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protection, they must be ready to face the possible disadvantages of the
regime.159
A prudent approach to addressing these types of cases requires
deliberate and careful consideration of the many issues raised in the Article,
including the rights of a trade secret owner to maintain the protection of his
or her valued information versus the right of the public (and competitors) to
use information found in the public domain. The conduct leading to the
disclosure does not necessarily change the analysis presented in this paper.
Thus, disclosure which occurs as a result of an inadvertent disclosure by the
trade secret owner or one of his/her agents, is treated in the same manner as
a disclosure resulting from the criminal or other illegal conduct by an
employee or third person. Nonetheless, the model is informed by the
various legal frameworks and theories discussed thus far in this paper.
A. Threshold Issue – Establish Trade Secret Status
As a threshold matter, preliminary consideration must be given to
determine whether the trade secret owner can reasonably establish160 that
the information in question was entitled to trade secret protection before it

159
As discussed earlier, supra Section VII, the harshness of such a rule is not unique to trade secret law,
and is supported by both constitutional and patent law principles.
160
The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of success on the merits standard
used in preliminary injunction cases. Most trade secret cases, particularly in the context of the problem presented
here, will be decided at a preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, use of this standard should present no further
difficulty, and may very well fold into the injunction test.
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was misappropriated on the Internet. In particular, the most critical part of
that inquiry should be whether the trade secret owner took reasonable steps
to preserve the secrecy of the information. This is consistent with the law
and practice already required in trade secret misappropriation cases, as the
trade secret owner bears the burden of establishing the trade secret status of
the information. Furthermore, the extent to which the allegedly trade secret
information is available or has been disclosed through sources, other than
the Internet, will also be relevant to determining trade secret status.161
If the court determines that the trade secret owner is not likely to
succeed in proving that the information was trade secret, then the bright line
rule of trade secret disclosure should apply and the inquiry need not proceed
any further. That is, the trade secret owner is not entitled to enjoin use of
the alleged trade secret information disclosed on the Internet. As a practical
matter, this is reasonable in light of the fact that failure to prove trade secret
status is fatal to any claim for misappropriation, and is especially so where,
as here, the action would involve an independent third party who accessed
the information from the public domain.
If a court determines that the information was deserving of trade
secret status before it was allegedly misappropriated, then the next step is to

161
See, e.g., RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1368 (noting that information was available in a public court
file for twenty eight months in addition to having been posted on the Internet).
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determine via the factors below whether, despite the disclosure, it has
nonetheless retained its trade secret status.162 The choice to phrase the
inquiry in terms of retention of status, rather than loss of status is deliberate,
as it underscores the underlying expectation that retention of trade secret
status after disclosure is the exception, not the rule. Accordingly, it is
expected that with rigorous application and weighing of these factors, only
a very small number of cases would qualify for retention status.
B. The Three Factors
Of the three factors identified below, the first two focus on the trade
secret owner and the trade secret. The first factor considers the time
interval of trade secret exposure and whether the owner was sufficiently
prompt in acting to save the trade secret after discovering the disclosure.
The second factor looks at whether the trade secret has essentially entered
the public domain as a result of the disclosure. In light of the equitable
considerations underlying trade secret law, however, it also seems fair to
introduce a third factor which considers the recipient’s good faith. This
factor will specifically answer whether the independent third party has
misappropriated the trade secret and therefore should be enjoined. This
inquiry is entirely consistent with the definition of misappropriation which

162
This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures may not lead to loss of trade
secret protection. See, e.g., Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at *32
(W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004); B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 30-31 (Wis. App. 1987); see also
Rest.3d Unfair Competition, § 39, com. f, p. 431.
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includes consideration of the recipient’s knowledge that the information is
another’s trade secret.163 The factors ought to be evaluated sequentially, at
least to the extent that the first two must be considered before the third.
1. Time and Action
This first factor would require consideration of the amount of time
that the information was exposed on the Internet, and the promptness of any
action by the trade secret owner to have the information removed. In sum,
more favorable consideration will be given to (a) information that has been
posted for a very short period of time (24-48 hours) and (b) where the
owner discovered the publication and took action immediately (within 2448 hours) to have it removed. By analogy, given the importance of trade
secrets to a business, this factor expects the trade secret owner to treat
discovery of a disclosure similar to what one would expect of a parent who
discovers a child may be missing.
In light of the threat to trade secrets posed by the Internet, trade
secret owners have an obligation to monitor the Internet for potential
wrongful disclosures. Were there any question of the existence of this
obligation, the examination of the issues in this Article leaves no doubt that
such must be the case. In deciding to choose trade secret protection over
163

This reasoning is also similar to the tipper/tippee theory of liability in insider trading which extends
liability to tippees who trade based on inside information received from a misappropriator, providing that the
tippee knows or has reason to know the tipper breached a duty of trust and confidence. See SEC Rule 10(b)(5).
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other options to protect intellectual property (e.g. patent law) a trade secret
owner undertakes this responsibility as part of the bundle of disadvantages
associated with trade secret protection.
The amount of time of exposure and promptness of action which
will be considered sufficient will depend on the circumstances. However,
the rate at which information moves through the Internet, dictates that the
promptness measure be correspondingly rapid. Information that has been
posted for more than approximately twenty-four to forty-eight hours is
much more likely to have become “generally known” and thus not meet the
test for trade secret protection.
A trade secret owner who discovers the information must respond
immediately and can show that it took prompt action by, for instance, filing
a lawsuit, seeking an emergency temporary injunction, contacting the
Internet service provider to have the information removed,164 or sending a
cease and desist letter.165 While this is not an exclusive list, the goal is to
separate those who have “slept on their rights” upon discovering the

164
The tools currently in place for addressing removals from websites are not satisfactory given the
special concerns posed in these kinds of cases. If trade secret owners are to bear the burden of acting swiftly to
remove trade secrets from websites, then it is incumbent upon our legal system to provide the appropriate efficient
and effective mechanisms to do so. A mechanism akin to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor
provisions for Internet service providers who post copyright protected materials is a useful starting point. 17
U.S.C. § 512 (1999). The author plans to address this topic in a separate forthcoming paper.
165
The appropriate strategy must be carefully tailored in light of the circumstances. See Victoria A.
Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet: Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842
PLI/PAT 347, 355-59 (2005) (discussing considerations in litigating to remove trade secrets from the Internet).
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potentially fatal disclosure, from those who have acted consistent with the
danger that has befallen their business. This requirement also implicitly
provides corroborative evidence of the true value of the trade secret the
business.
2. Extent of Disclosure
The second factor considers the extent of the disclosure. This
includes not only how much of the trade secret was disclosed, but is also
related to the first factor in trying to ascertain the nature of the site on which
the information was posted (public availability). It attempts to address the
necessary element, whether the secret became “generally known or
knowable.” It further permits exploration of the premise that “[p]ublication
on the Internet does not necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is
sufficiently obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not
become generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors
or other persons to whom the information would have some economic
value.”166
This factor evaluates the specific site on which the information was
posted. A more prominent disclosure on a highly visited web page might
require more prompt action, and greater concern, than a disclosure in an

166

Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 252.
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obscure, members-only chat room, with limited membership. If the
information was published on a network with controlled access to a specific
membership, particularly where the membership is a small, well-defined,
and finite group, weighs in favor of the trade secret owner. If, however, the
group consists of precisely the relevant people who would most benefit
from the information, then it may be more difficult to argue that the trade
secret has not become “generally known.” One further advantage to a
closed network is that their identities are known, and it might be easier to
obtain injunctive relief against them.167
The amount of secret information that was disclosed may also be
probative of whether the information deserves to retain its trade secret
status. In circumstances where only portions of the trade secret were
disclosed, and the remaining undisclosed portions continue to maintain their
competitive value to the trade secret owner, then a court could find that the
trade secret protection has not been completely lost.168
This examination of the extent of the disclosure is supported by nonInternet related cases that require something more than mere public
accessibility of the trade secret, namely publication, before finding loss of
167

See Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist For Disclosure in The
Information Age? 18 Rev. Litig. 317, 338 (1999).
168

See Smokenders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 309, 317 (S. D. Fla.); Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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the protection. For instance, in cases addressing unsealed filing of trade
secret information in public court records, evidence of further publication of
the trade secret is required to destroy trade secret protection.169 Admittedly,
the nature of the Internet is such that, unlike a public court file in a court
house, publication to the relevant public can be virtually instantaneous, and,
as such, there is a significantly smaller window of opportunity for the trade
secret owner to protect the secret status of the information. Nonetheless,
this factor allows for a thoughtful assessment of the extent of exposure by a
court, rather than a presumption that the disclosure (particularly in isolation)
destroyed the secret.

3. Recipient’s Reason to Know the Information was Trade Secret
This final factor turns from the trade secret owner’s actions to the
recipient’s state of mind and is an important part of the definition of
misappropriation. Related to the first factor, if the trade secret owner
provided notice to the recipient in a timely fashion that the information was
trade secret, then the acquisition by “improper means” may be a stronger
case. Furthermore, if the evidence independently suggests that the recipient

169

See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 418-19 (4th Cir. 1999)(discussing
cases dealing with disclosure of trade secrets in court files); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993).
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knew or should have known the trade secret status of the information then it
will weigh in favor of the trade secret owner.
Under the UTSA one is liable for misappropriation if “he obtains
information from a third person and then discloses or uses it knowing, or
possessing information from which he should know, at the time of
disclosure or use that the information is a trade secret and that it had been
misappropriated by the third person.”170 The defendant’s knowledge that
the information was trade secret is also evidence of misappropriation under
the Restatement of Torts as well.171 Circumstantial evidence can be
weighed to determine the likelihood that the defendant knew the acquisition
was wrongful, and a defendant cannot shield himself by “studious ignorance
of pertinent ‘warning’ facts.”172 Defendant’s constructive notice that the
information was trade secret is sufficient.173 The Restatement’s definition
of notice provides guidance:
One has notice of facts . . . when he knows of them or when
he should know of them . . . . He should know of them if,
from the information which he has, a reasonable man would
infer the facts in question, or if, under the circumstances, a
170
IMED Corp. v Systems Engineering Associates Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) (interpreting
state version of the UTSA).
171

See id. at 347; see also section II (B)(1) supra.

172

Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., Inc., 381 Mass. 1, 6 (1980) (citations

omitted).
173

See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3221, at *18 (N. D. Ill. March 16, 1998).

27-Aug-06]

SAVING TRADE SECRET DISCLOSURES

57

reasonable man would be put on inquiry and an inquiry
pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would
disclose the facts.174
Accordingly, if the evidence suggests that a reasonable person would have
been on notice175 that the information received was the wrongfully
disclosed trade secret of another, then the defendant should be liable for
misappropriation.176
Even though the burden of proof remains with the trade secret owner
to prove defendant’s guilty state of mind, it will be important for the
defendant to marshal facts to effectively prove a negative in defense; that
she did not have reason to know the information was trade secret. In doing
so, she may rely on the argument that the trade secret, through its posting,
had become generally available. In expressing that position, it is important
to try to avoid the tautological reasoning that has befallen some courts, i.e.
whether the information was trade secret in the first place.177 Thus, the line
between the defendant’s state of mind and the generally availability of the
information, may become blurred in the analysis. As one court noted, for
instance:
174

Restatement of Torts § 757, Comment 1 (1939).

175

This generally refers to notice at the time of the disclosure. However, notice from the trade secret
owner after the initial disclosure may also suffice. See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No.
93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3221, at *17 (N. D. Ill. March 16, 1998).
176

See C&F Packing Co., Inc. v. IBP, Inc. and Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 93C1601, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3221, at *18 (N. D. Ill. March 16, 1998).
177

See, e.g., Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 253 (suggesting that knowledge about the unethical origin of
the information is insufficient to prevent use of information that has become publicly available).
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In a case that receives widespread publicity, just about
anyone who becomes aware of the contested information
would also know that it was allegedly created by improper
means. . . in such a case the general public could
theoretically be liable for misappropriation simply by
disclosing it to someone else. This is not what trade secret
law is designed to do.178
One value of this model and the factors presented here is that the question
whether information qualifies as a trade secret, would have already been
answered positively as a threshold matter. Thus, at this point in the model,
an analysis of the facts supporting the defendant’s state of mind would be
separate from that question.179 Evidence of the defendant’s state of mind
relative to the trade secret status of the information will also depend on the
particular circumstances, and would consider any bad faith on the part of
the defendant. A defendant could also present any First Amendment or
other defenses at this juncture.
Evidence of the trade secret owner’s proactive steps or prior
relationship with the defendant may also bear on the defendant’s bad faith
or culpable knowledge. Materials which are clearly labeled and stamped
indicating that they are confidential, proprietary or trade secret will be
helpful.180 Evidence that this particular defendant has previously tried,

178

Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 253.

179
This knowledge requirement is consistent with the criminal claim for theft of trade secrets found in the
Economic Espionage Act, which requires that the defendant knowingly stole or otherwise obtained the trade secret
information. See 18 USCA § 1832.
180

See, e.g., O’Grady v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. H028579, 2006 WL 1452685 at *3 (Cal. App. May
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legitimately or illegitimately, to obtain the trade secret from the owner may
also be relevant. Attempts to extort benefits from the trade secret owner in
exchange for returning the materials would also signal culpability.181
Finally, evidence that the defendant knew the trade secrets were obtained in
violation of a confidentiality agreement, license agreement, or a fiduciary
obligation weighs in favor of the plaintiff.182
If someone other than the original misappropriator posted the
information (and is the first to do so), then she, as the publisher, ought to be
in a worse position than the independent third party who discovers the
posting.183 That person or entity is likely to fall within a conspiracy type
analysis, for obtaining the secret from the misappropriator with knowledge
of the wrongful acquisition.184 Having received the information directly

26, 2006) (noting that electronic slides were “conspicuously marked as ‘Apple Need-to-Know Confidential.’”).
181
See, e.g. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747, 753 (E. D. Mich. 1999) (defendant
threatened to publish “disturbing” materials about plaintiff on his website, and to solicit trade secrets from
plaintiff’s employees).
182
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 873 (2003) (discussing that trade
secrets were obtained through reverse engineering in violation of license agreement, and that defendants knew of
this improper means of acquiring the trade secret).
183
This would encompass owners and operators of web sites who make decisions about what materials to
publish on their sites. Analogous to their traditional media counterparts, editors and reports of newspapers and
magazines for instance, they could be liable to the trade secret owner and subject to an injunction. This is an
unsettled area of the law, however, and the argument espoused here appears to be novel. See generally O’Grady,
2006 WL 1452685 at *22 (reasoning that operators of web sites are “publishers”); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001) (addressing whether the media may be liable for using information unlawfully obtained by a
third party); MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW CASES
th
AND MATERIALS 536-547 (7 ed. 2005).

But see Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E. D. Mich. 1999) (refusing to enjoin
publication where no fiduciary duty or confidentiality agreement exists); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)(refusing to enjoin publication of trade secrets improperly obtained in
violation of a protective order).
184

See Lockridge., 209 Kan. at 393.
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from the original misappropriator, or an associate/agent, and then deciding
to post it carries, at the very least, a taint of misappropriation.185 Posting the
information does not purge that taint, and precludes the poster, like the
original misappropriator, from claiming that the information has now
become generally known and is not a trade secret.186
VIII. SUMMARY AND APPLICATION OF THE SEQUENTIAL PRESERVATION
MODEL
To more clearly illustrate the connection between the components of
the model and their theoretical underpinnings, I present the summary below.
In the subsection that follows I then work through some of the case
examples to illustrate application of the model.
A. Theoretical Checklist of the Model
A court faced with an Internet disclosure problem can utilize this
model (in conjunction with application of the preliminary injunction

185
Cf. RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 at 1369 (“Because there is no evidence that The Post abused any
confidence, committed and impropriety, violated any court order or committed any other improper act in
gathering information from the court file or down loading information form the Internet, there is no possible
liability for The Post in its acquisition of the information.”)

Some Supreme Court cases also support the proposition that the conduct of a publisher may be taken
into consideration in deciding whether to grant First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
186
See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Once a secret
is out, the rest of the world may well have a right to copy it at will; but this should not protect the misappropriator
or his privies.”); see also Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc., 209 Kan. 389, 393 (1972)(“We do not believe that a
misappropriator or his privies can ‘baptize’ their wrongful actions by general publication of the secret.”)
cf. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(Where FDA had posted
plaintiff’s trade secrets on its website without authorization, it could still be liable for misappropriation even
though the trade secrets had been publicly available on the website for five months).
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standard)187 to determine whether the trade secret status of the information
has been preserved and whether to enjoin an independent third party. One
value of this process is that it provides for deliberate consideration of the
trade secret law requirements, avoiding automatic and potentially erroneous
assumptions on a case by case basis.
A. Was the disclosed information deserving of trade secret
protection before it was posted on the Internet? This is
the threshold determination. If no, then there is no need
to apply the model: there cannot be misappropriation and
an injunction cannot issue. If yes, then proceed to the
rest of the model.
B. Did the information retain its trade secret status despite
the Internet posting? To answer this question, apply the
first two factors to the facts of the case. If the answer is
no, do not proceed further and end the analysis. There
cannot be misappropriation or an injunction for that
which is not a trade secret. If the answer is yes, then
proceed to the final step.
C. Was there misappropriation by the defendant
independent third party? To answer this question, apply
the third factor regarding the defendant’s state of mind.
If the answer is yes, then an injunction should issue;
otherwise, there is no trade secret liability and an
injunction is not appropriate.

187

See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 201-07 (2005)(discussing implications of seeking
injunctive relief in a misappropriation case).
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B. Application with Case Examples
The case examples below illustrate the impact of the various phases
of the model. For ease of reference I use the cases that have already been
discussed in the Article, and which also happen to be among the main cases
of relevance in this area. Relying on the facts as reported in the respective
opinions is limiting in so far as we are bound by the context and posture of
the case as it originally presented. Taken together, however, they are
nonetheless useful for illustrating various aspects of the model. In some
instances the original outcome of the case is consistent with the outcome
that would have been achieved using the model. That may very well be
because of the court’s attempt to reach an equitable result, rather than a
more principled reasoning process, such as that offered by the model.
1. Religious Technology Center v. Lerma
This case likely fails the threshold part of the model because the
information arguably lost its trade secret protection even before Lerma
posted it on the Internet (and thus well before the Post obtained it). That is
mostly because the documents were present in an open court file for about
twenty-eight months prior to Lerma’s Internet publication,188 signifying a
failure to protect the secret status of the information. The court could have
been persuaded, however, by the Church’s argument that the appearance in

188

See Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1368.
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the court file was beyond its control and despite its best efforts. Indeed, not
only had the Church filed a motion seeking that the court seal the file,189 but
after denial of that motion it took the extraordinary precaution of having a
church member check out the court file every day to prevent others from
seeing it.190
Even if a court were swayed by that argument, and the analysis
moved to the second part of the model, it would certainly fail at this stage.
In considering the first two factors of the model, the fatal blow would be
dealt by the fact that before the Post acquired the information for its story,
the documents had been posted on the Internet (by Lerma) for more than ten
days191 (exceeding the 24-48 hour guideline suggested in the model), on a
publicly available website and would thus be generally known.
Accordingly, the model would direct that the trade secret status of the
information had not been preserved. The court’s holding that the Post’s
actions did not constitute misappropriation is consistent with the outcome
under the model.

189

908 F. Supp. at 1364.

190

Id. at 1365.

191

Id. at 1368.
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2. DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner
Whether the disclosed information in this case was deserving of
trade secret protection before it was posted on the Internet by Bunner, is a
question that the court ought to have addressed in greater detail.192 The
precise information that the plaintiff claimed as a trade secret was DeCSS,
which had not in fact been created by it, but through reverse engineering.193
Because a person may lawfully reverse engineer another’s trade secrets,194
and given that the defendants in this case had not themselves reverse
engineered the plaintiff’s code, it is highly questionable that the DeCSS
should have been entitled to trade secret protection.195 Moreover, the
evidence suggests that by the time Bunner posted the code on his website, it
had already been “distributed to a worldwide audience of millions.”196
Accordingly, a rigorous analysis under the model would have failed the
threshold.

192
In one sentence, the court notes that “[w]e have only very thin circumstantial evidence of when,
where, or how [the reverse engineering] actually happened or whether an enforceable contract prohibiting reverse
engineering was ever formed.” 116 Cal. App. 4th at 253.
193

Id. at 246.

194

See section II(A) supra.

195
The plaintiff claimed that the reverse engineering occurred in breach of a license agreement. Id.
Nevertheless, under the facts of the case the presence of a trade secret is dubious. See also, Pamela Samuelson,
Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Aug. 9, 2006 draft)
(discussing use of mass market licenses to override the reverse engineering privilege of trade secret law).
196

116 Cal. App. 4th at 252.
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Since the court assumed, however, that the reverse engineered code
was entitled to trade secret protection, then the analysis would proceed to
the second part of the model. It took DVD CCA approximately two months
to file legal action against Bunner, after discovering his posting.197 Such
delayed action would not survive the prompt action required under the
model. Further crippling the plaintiff at this stage is that the level of the
disclosure was extensive: “by the time [the] lawsuit was filed hundreds of
Web sites had posted the program, enabling untold numbers of persons to
download it and use it.”198 Consequently, there was no preservation and no
trade secret to misappropriate. The court’s denial of an injunction fits the
model.199
3. O’Grady v. Superior Court
Although the focus of this case was on resolving a discovery
dispute200 rather than deciding a trade secret misappropriation case, the facts
provide a useful illustration for the model. The case presents some thorny
issues, the implications of which are worth wrestling with under the model,

197

Id. at 255.

198

Id.

199
Under the reasoning stemming from the model, the defendant’s First Amendment defense would not
have been reached, because there would be no need to invoke the third part of the model (which would have
considered defendant’s state of mind and defenses).
200
Petitioners in the case sought a protective order to prevent Apple Computer, Inc. from discovering the
identities of anonymous persons who had provided allegedly trade secret information to them about Apple’s
plan’s to release a new product. See 2006 WL 1452685 at * 5. The petitioners posted the information on their
web sites. Id. at *3.
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even if only at the margins. More specifically, unlike the other cases
discussed in this section, here, the third party, O’Grady, did not obtain the
alleged trade secrets from an Internet posting, but rather was the first to post
the information on the Internet after having obtained it elsewhere.
The less challenging part of the analysis is that the threshold
determination is more easily met here than in the two prior cases. Apple
Computer Inc.’s (Apple) plans to release a new product would likely qualify
for trade secret protection before it was posted by O’Grady and/or sent to
him by e-mail. Some of the information was derived from an Apple
electronic presentation clearly labeled “Apple Need-to-Know Confidential,”
and Apple would have demonstrated that it “undertakes rigorous and
extensive measures to safeguard information about its unreleased
products.”201 Apple was further prepared to show that the information
“could have been obtained only through a breach of an Apple
confidentiality agreement.”202 Given all of these indicia of steps to protect
the secrecy of the information and of its competitive value to the company,
the threshold requirement would be satisfied.203

201

Id. at * 3.

202

Id. at *4.

203
The court here, in the context of its First Amendment analysis and while distinguishing Bunner,
suggests that certain types of information are more worthy of trade secret protection than others. In particular, the
court mentions that the kind of information at issue here (plans to release a product) may not rise to the same level
as technical information about how to create the product. Id. at * 36. While that kind of reasoning might be of
some (albeit limited) merit in a First Amendment analysis of newsworthiness (see id. at *37), it is not appropriate
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At this point the retention analysis becomes complicated. O’Grady
does not fit the third party who finds the trade secret on the Internet mold
because he allegedly received the trade secret information via e-mail from
Apple insiders. 204 Accordingly, the underlying principles supporting the
model would suggest that we bypass the question of retention and proceed
to the misappropriation inquiry.205 In analyzing O’Grady’s state of mind
and reason to know that the information was trade secret, a court should
weigh such factors as the “taint” associated with his having received (and
perhaps solicited) the trade secrets from Apple insiders against him.206 As a
publisher, however, he would be entitled to raise his First Amendment
defense and the newsworthiness of the disclosure, and ultimately may
prevail.

for determining whether information is entitled to trade secret protection in the first instance. The UTSA and
other applicable trade secret frameworks already provide the criteria for such determinations, and those ought to
be sufficient. There is no sliding scale: either something is a trade secret or it is not. As even the O’Grady court
has expressed in reference to information that is worthy of publication, “courts must be extremely wary about
declaring what information is worthy of [trade secret protection] and what information is not” because to do
otherwise would undermine trade secret law.
204

See id. at *11.

205

Although e-mails involve use of the Internet, they generally do not rise to the same level as Internet
postings for the purposes of the analyses presented in this paper. Because they are typically directed to a
relatively small number of people or a finite group, e-mails do not generally have the instant mass dissemination
quality of an Internet posting on a publicly available web site. (I recognize, however, that spam e-mails and the
ability of recipients to forward e-mails to others in virtually unlimited fashion, could be problematic. Thus, in the
event a trade secret is disseminated in this fashion the analysis may be affected). Accordingly, the likelihood of
the information having entered the public domain and lost its trade secret status is not as strong when transmitted
by e-mail (see sections IV-VI supra). As a result, the theoretical framework would more closely resemble nonthird party Internet cases and proceed to the misappropriation finding, once the trade secret owner has established
key elements such as value and secrecy.
206

See notes 184-187 and accompanying text supra.
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Finally, permit me to indulge in one more modification in order to
create a true third party Internet disclosure scenario and engage in a
retention analysis under the model. Assume that an Apple competitor
discovered the product release plans from O’Grady’s postings, and Apple
files a misappropriation action against the competitor. The facts of the case
would suggest that the trade secret would not be preserved.
The retention inquiry would focus on Apple’s reaction to O’Grady’s
postings, and the nature of those postings. O’Grady’s articles about the new
product ran on five separate days, and Apple’s first “cease and desist”
contact to O’Grady came nineteen days after the first article appeared.207 It
took five more days after that to file the complaint.208 While this may have
been relatively prompt action for a plaintiff merely seeking to identify the
sources of a breach of confidentiality, it is not enough for one seeking to
prevent information from becoming generally known to the relevant public.
The fact that O’Grady’s web site was “devoted to news and information
about Apple Macintosh computers” leaves little doubt that the trade secret
reached the relevant people.209

207

See id. at *1 -*3.

208

Id. at *3.

209

Id. at *1.
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The nature and amount of information disclosed would also weigh
against Apple. To the extent it claims its plan to release this particular
product as a trade secret in order to control “timing and publicity for its
product launches,”210 then O’Grady’s articles stole its thunder and there
was nothing left of the secret to preserve. The trade secret would therefore
be lost, and the competitor would be entitled to use it.211
4. United States v. Genovese
As a result of its procedural posture and context, this case does not
provide sufficient relevant details to work through each sequence of the
model.212 It does, however, provide a useful illustration for the third part of
the model, and as such, I will make certain assumptions and draw
inferences where the voids exist. First among those assumptions is that the
Microsoft source code was a trade secret before it was posted on the
Internet. Genovese himself “acknowledged that the source code was
proprietary to Microsoft and that someone else penetrated whatever
safeguards Microsoft enlisted to protect it.”213

210

Id. at * 3.

211

Assuming, arguendo, that Apple had acted within twenty-four hours of the first article to stem further
publication about the new product, then there may have been a better chance of preserving the secret. In keeping
with the court’s reasoning, O’Grady’s First Amendment arguments in the final part of the model, however, may
have saved him from a misappropriation finding.
212
It is a ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment under the Economic Espionage Act. See
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at *1.
213

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at *13.
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The are essentially no facts with which to determine whether the
source code retained its trade secret protection by the time Genovese found
it on the Internet.214 I will, therefore, assume that the facts (similar to the
hypothetical presented at the beginning of the paper) would show that
Microsoft acted with the requisite promptness to stem the dissemination of
the code, and that the extent of the disclosure was minimal,215 thereby
preserving the trade secret status of the information.
Finally, we would arrive at the misappropriation stage of the model
and examine Genovese’s reason to know that the source code was a
Microsoft trade secret, and the presence of any bad faith. On that point, the
evidence exists and weighs in favor of Microsoft. The court notes that
Genovese (a) describes the code as “jacked,”216 (b) indicates that others
would have to “look hard” to find it elsewhere, (c) was on notice that
Microsoft had not publicly released the code, and (d) offers the code for sale
and successfully sells it because of its relative obscurity.217 It is also highly
unlikely that he would succeed on a First Amendment defense, given that he

214
Id. at *10-11. The opinion does not indicate, for instance, the web site from which he downloaded the
code, how long it appeared on the site, what action (if any) Microsoft undertook to remove the information from
that site, and with what degree of promptness.
215
In attempting to sell the source code, Genovese indicated that “others would have to ‘look hard’ to find
it elsewhere.” Id. at *10.
216
An abbreviation for “hijacked,” which the court interpreted to mean “stolen” or “misappropriated.”
U.S. v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
217

Id.
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was behaving more as a salesman than a reporter. Accordingly, this would
present an appropriate case for an injunction.

IX. REMEDIES
A court, finding misappropriation after hearing the facts and
weighing the factors presented above should issue an injunction.218 The
scope of that injunction will vary depending on the particular
circumstances.219 Removal of the information from the web site (if it has
not already occurred) would certainly be necessary.220 A court could further
enjoin the recipient from using the information, at least for a certain period
of time. While this does not erase the information from the hands of a
competitor, it could at least mitigate some of the damage by delaying use of
the information in a manner that would allow the defendant to compete
unfairly with the trade secret owner.221 The injunction should also prohibit
the defendant, and his/her agents, from further disseminating the
information.

218
Where the defendant has made use of the trade secret, a court could also order monetary damages in
addition to an injunction. See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.02[B] (4th ed.
2005).
219
The three types of injunctions in trade secret cases are 1) prohibitions against disclosure or use, 2)
sanctions against engagement in competitive employment, and 3) bans on the manufacture of products in which
the trade secret is an essential ingredient. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 10.5 (3), at 694-95 (2d ed. 1993).
220

Note that a “cached” version of information may continue to reside in search engines even after the
information has been removed from an active page. Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet:
Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT 347, 351 (2005).
221

See DVD v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 253-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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A more difficult problem for the trade secret owner, however, would
be that other members of the public, other than those named in the suit,
could not be enjoined from using the information.222 Because law and
public policy favor the unfettered use of information in the public domain,
and courts likely lack jurisdiction to enjoin non-parties in a law suit, the
trade secret owner’s prospects for containing use of the information are
bleak.223
A trade secret owner can pursue a misappropriation claim against
the original misappropriator (if known), and may also have claims against
those who aid and abetted the misappropriation. Thus, to the extent the
information was posted by someone other than the original misappropriator,
that person may also be liable. Even if the misappropriator may have
succeeded in destroying the trade secret status of the information vis a vis
others, trade secret law does not permit him or her to benefit from use of the
information.224 Thus, for instance, such a person is not entitled to claim
immunity on the basis that the information is no longer secret. Assuming,
222
See U.S. v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998)(“A district court may not enjoin nonparties who are neither acting in concert with the enjoined party nor are in the capacity of agents, employees,
officers, etc. of the enjoined party.”) (citations omitted); see also Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc.
v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
223
See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 254 (noting that an injunction is inappropriate where the information
is no longer secret).

A trade secret owner may consider turning to other areas of law for relief or to criminal prosecution.
Depending on the nature of the trade secret information, copyright laws, for instance might be an alternative
avenue.
224

See Lockridge, 209 Kan. at 393 .
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as is often the case, that the misappropriator does not have deep pockets,
however, a victory against him may be hollow and unsatisfying for a trade
secret owner who now suffers the permanent loss of its trade secret.225
Given the current status of the law, it becomes clear that a trade
secret owner’s best and most effective weapon is protection of the trade
secret information to prevent disclosure in the first place.226 This requires
absolute vigilance and knowledge of potential threats, among the most
dangerous of these being the Internet. In the event that a disclosure is made
despite best efforts, prompt action in addressing the situation is critical.227
Since trade secret owners have the legal burden of proving the trade secret
status of their information when they seek to enforce protection, it is
incumbent upon them to be mindful of that burden long before litigation
arises. Otherwise, it may be too late once the milk has been spilled.

225

See Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 254.

226
Trade secret owners can step such proactive steps as entering into clear and specific non-disclosure
agreements with employees and other authorized persons, limiting disclosure of information to a need-to-know
basis, clearly marking documents as confidential and trade secret, and monitoring employees. See generally
Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7
Tul. J. Technology. & Intell. Prop. 167, 192 n. 171 (2005); Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and The Internet:
Preventing The Internet From Being An Instrument of Destruction, 842 PLI/PAT 347, 353-54 (2005).
227
This is consistent with some courts finding that accidental disclosures may not lead to loss of trade
secret protection. See, e.g., Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., No. SA-01-CA-646-OG, 2004 WL 2359420, at *32
(W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004); B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 30-31 (Wis. App. 1987); see also
Rest.3d Unfair Competition, § 39, com. f, p. 431. In light of the unique potentially destructive power of the
Internet, trade secret owners should also be provided with the necessary legal tools and resources with which to
exercise their duty of vigilance and to facilitate removal of trade secret information that has been posted, or where
posting is imminent. In that regard, legislative action may be necessary to ensure that the laws that regulate the
Internet and Internet providers incorporate considerations of the danger the Internet poses to trade secrets and
more generally, businesses.
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X. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article I presented the hypothetical involving
Soft Corporation. Where a trade secret, such as the source code for a
program, is stolen from its owner and posted on the Internet, the default rule
would be that it becomes a free for all. By virtue of the fact that it has been
posted, it becomes public, and consequently loses its trade secret protection.
The ensuing result is that independent third parties, including competitors,
are entitled to use it, and the trade secret owner, despite years of laudable
efforts to maintain the secret, suffers a fatal loss at the hands of a
wrongdoer. The apparent injustice in that conclusion does not go
unnoticed.
Given that trade secret law is intended to regulate the moral and
ethical pulse of competitive commercial behavior, this Article set out to
explore the problem presented by trade secret Internet disclosures, and to
identify whether at least in some circumstances it may be possible to retain
trade secret status after a disclosure. Review of the various legal theories
supports the general rule that trade secret status is lost upon disclosure.
Nevertheless, considering the equitable and doctrinal considerations
underlying trade secret law, and drawing from analogous attorney client
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privilege cases, there is support for an argument that trade secret status may
be saved in some circumstances.
Accordingly, I presented a model, comprised of three factors, which
may be used as a guide to decide which cases qualify for this exception.
The model is drawn from and supported by the various legal issues
surrounding the problem. While, in reality, it may only save a small
number of cases from the general rule, its value lies in its use as an
instrument that may be applied by courts to yield consistent results. It
provides an avenue to work within the existing constraints of trade secret
law to hopefully achieve more just results in compelling cases. It illustrates
that “[t]he Internet, as a mode of communication and a system of
information delivery is new, but the rules governing the protection of
property rights, and how that protection may be enforced under the new
technology, need not be.”228

228

Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912-913 (Cal. App. Ct. 2001).

